TOPIC: RODERICK CHISHOLM’S PROBLEM OF CRITERION: AN EXPOSITION
AUTHOR: JOSHUA NNADIMMA AYOZIE
CLASSROOM PAPER
EMAIL:michealjoshua6@gmail.com
1.0- Introduction
Two quite different questions of the theory of knowledge are questions “What do we know?”and “How are we to decide, in any particular case, whether we know?”The first of these may also be put by asking “What is the extent of our knowledge?”and the second, by asking “What are the criteria of knowing?”If we know the answer to either one of these questions, then, perhaps, we may devise a procedure that will enable us to answer the other. If we can specify the criteria of knowledge, we may have a way of deciding how far our knowledge extends. Or if we know how far it does extend, and are able to say what the things are that we know, then we may be able to formulate criteria enabling us to mark off the things that we do know from those that we do not. But if we do not have the answer to the first question, then, it would seem, we have no way of answering the second. And if we do not have the answer to the second, then, it would seem, we have no way of answering the first. It is characteristic of “empiricism”(but not only of” empiricism”) to assume that we have an answer to the second of these two questions and then to attempt to answer the first on the basis of the answer to the second. Experience, in one or another of its various senses, is said to be the source of our knowledge; every valid claim to knowledge, it is sup-posed, will satisfy certain empirical criteria; and these criteria, it is then concluded, may be used to determine the extent of our knowledge. Empiricism thus begins paradoxically with a general premise .But if Hume is right, a consistent application of these criteria indicates that we know next to nothing about ourselves and about the physical objects around us.
Therefore, this paper tends to investigate into an already existing epistemic question and problem “the Criterion or rather the criteria of knowledge”. Be that as it may, this paper would study and provide an exposition on the criteria of knowledge following Roderick Chisholm’s approach and after which comes up with its epistemological relevance. It is not out of place to state that the problem of Criterion was first investigated by Sextus Empiricus in the ancient time but this paper shall focus on Rederick Chisholm’s. To achieve the objectives of this paper, this paper shall take up the below out line. That is to say that outside this introduction, this paper would look into some sort of explication of terms like: a workable meaning of epistemology using etymological help, what does criterion or Criteria means, has criteria an epistemic meaning outside its literal meaning, is knowledge the same thing with Epistemology? That is, can the both terms be used interchangeably?
Those are hardly all; this paper would further provide an exposition for the Roderick Chisholm’s approach on Criterion of Knowledge with its epistemological relevance as stated above. Finally if need be this paper shall then conclude with some sort of conclusion and evaluation.
1.0- Explication of terms
What is Epistemology? (Etymology and a workable meaning)
The word Epistemology, etymologically speaking is derived from the ancient Greek words “epistēmē”, meaning “knowledge”, and the suffix “-logia”, meaning “logical discourse” (derived from the Greek word logos meaning “discourse”). An extension in meaning of Logos could as well means science, study etc. By implication and interpreting the meaning from the etymology present by this paper, it shows that Epistemology is a discipline and if need be one should know that it is a branch of philosophy whose work is to present to its lover and human beings imbedded with rational faculty a logical discourse and not every or any how discourse on knowledge. That is to say that “Epistemology” as a branch of Philosophy would address the question of what it means to know and how one could know that one knows and criteria of knowing.
It is not outside of the scope of epistemology by implication, to address the question of “the implication” around the statement “I know”. For one to say that one knows exactly what one is insinuating, saying, stating and talking it means that the one in question must have had oneself purged of such things that could hinder one’s clarity of knowing and faculty of reasoning. That is to say that epistemology does the work of helping one let off those illusions that can affect thoughts, thinking, and reflection. Seeing, touching and speaking. One who thinks that one is sure of what one speaks and should be a one with a clear thinking.
Is it out of place to say that epistemology in itself is logical? Because from every indication not everything said to be knowledge is free from biases but whenever it is taken to be epistemic it means that it must have passed through the tests of logic and philosophy. This paper would hence state that Epistemology is branch of philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge, what is said to be knowledge and known, the truthfulness and validity of what could be known and criteria to determining what knowledge is and what could be knowledge that is certain and reliable.
2.0- Is knowledge the same thing as Epistemology?
Epistemology, the philosophical study of the nature, origin, and limits of human knowledge. It is of importance to note that the essence of this exercise is not to repeat what is already obvious with the given etymological approach to what epistemology is. Rather this paper would just pick out the necessary thing, which is finding out if “knowledge” is at the same time “epistemology” and if by implication the both could be used interchangeably.
The term “epistemology” comes from the Greek words “episteme” and “logos”. “Episteme” can be translated as “knowledge” or “understanding” or “acquaintance”, while “logos” can be translated as “account” or “argument” or “reason”. Just as each of these different translations captures some facet of the meaning of these Greek terms, so too does each translation capture a different facet of epistemology itself. Although the term “epistemology” is no more than a couple of centuries old, the field of epistemology is at least as old as any in philosophy.
Knowledge is a familiarity, awareness, or understanding of someone or something, such as facts (descriptive knowledge), skills (procedural knowledge), or objects (acquaintance knowledge). By most accounts, knowledge can be acquired in many different ways and from many sources, including but not limited to perception, reason, memory, testimony, scientific inquiry, education, and practice. The philosophical study of knowledge is called epistemology.
Be that as it may, the both terms “Epistemology” and “Knowledge” are nouns hence epistemology is translated as knowledge but epistemology is the science and philosophical branch that investigate into the nature, origin and correct means of knowing, knowledge and at the same time criteria and sources of knowledge.
4.0-What does Criteria means? Could there be an epistemic/Philosophical meaning outside its literal meaning?
Criteria is the plural of criterion—a standard or principle for judging, evaluating, or selecting something. Criteria are the ideals or requirements on which a judgment, evaluation, or selection is based.
Criteria are often the particular requirements that someone or something must meet in order to be considered or qualify for something. An applicant for a job may be evaluated based on several criteria, including their education, experience, and references—each one of these standards is a criterion. Your grade in a class may be based on certain criteria, such as your test scores, your grades on homework and other assignments, and your participation in class. Similarly, a gymnast’s score is based on several criteria involving how well they performed certain moves.
The word criteria is often used with the word meet, as in your entry meets all of our criteria for inclusion in the exhibit. Having looked at the literal meaning of Criteria and having seen that it has to do with requirements to meet to be considered to arriving at something this paper will therefore see what it means in the field of Philosophy.
Criterion (κριτήριον, κρίνειν, to discriminate; κριτὴς, judge).—(1) An organ by which truth is attained; (2) a ground of judgment, or a test of certainty, including forms of evidence, or standards of judgment. It has been distinguished into the criterion a quo, per quod, and secundum quod—or, the being who judges, the organ or faculty by which he does so, and the rule according to which he judges. The last is criterion in the proper sense. Since this paper’s objective is based on the epistemic value, the meaning this paper is trying to derived and arrived at would not be that outside the scope of its objectives. Therefore, criteria: simply put, cannon to be adopted and followed to attained knowledge, and its certainty. Again, the philosophical meaning is not farfetched from its literal meaning following what is already given. In other not to deviate from the requirements of this paper, the need to present an exposition of criterion (criteria) based on Roderick Chisholm’s thought is necessary.
5.0-Roderick Chisholm’s Problem of Criterion: An Exposition
One of Chisholmís earliest formulations of the problem of the criterion can be found in his Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, published in 1957. A modified account is found in his Theory of Knowledge , originally published in 1966. Chisholmís Aquinas lecture, published in 1973, provides his most extensive treatment of the subject; the lecture was aptly named as The Problem of the Criterion I will mainly follow the Aquinas lecture as the definitive guide to Chisholmís views on the problem of the criterion. Chisholm starts off his lecture by confessing the problem of the criterion to be one of the most important and one of the most difficult of all the problems of philosophy. Chisholm’s first characterization of the problem is a paraphrase of Montaigne, and it proceeds as follows:
To know whether things really are as they seem to be, we must have a procedure for distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know whether our procedures [sic]
is a good procedure, we have to know whether it really succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true from appearances that are false. And we cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already know which appearances are true and which ones are false. And so we are caught in a circle. Chisholm seems to take it for granted that there are different appearances. Indeed, this is a plausible assumption, for our lives are filled with myriad spectra of appearances. It is not necessary that appearances should be limited to perceptual beliefs, for just as it appears to me that I see a computer in front of me, just as well it could be said that it appears to me that two plus two equals four. The latter appearance is indeed a lucid and indisputable one. However, the crucial question is, despite the vividness or clarity of some of our appearances, is there something out there that properly corresponds to them? Briefly, are our appearances true? Even if my belief that two plus two equals four appears to me as certain, indubitable, and true, is it true? Certainty does not seem to be a satisfactory criterion of truth, for all kinds of madmen and bigots are dead certain about their absurd beliefs although all the others, the sane, can easily tell how nonsensical and false the fools’ beliefs are. Surely we know things, but how can we exactly distinguish the good and true beliefs from the bad and false ones? In my opinion, Chisholm is here dealing with the most fundamental questions of philosophy. Somehow we should be able to show both that the fanatics and madmen claim to know too much, and that we can know far more than the skeptic claims . Chisholm states the problem yet in a different way, speaking now of beliefs instead of appearances. He writes: The question we started with was: How are we to tell the good ones [beliefs] from the bad ones [beliefs]? In other words, we were asking: What is the proper method for deciding which are the good beliefs and which are the bad ones and which beliefs are genuine cases of knowledge and which beliefs are not? And now, you see, we are on the wheel. First, we want to find out which are the good beliefs and which are the bad ones. To find this out we have to have some way and some method and of deciding which are the good ones and which are the bad ones. Hence there are good and bad methods, good and bad ways of sorting out the good beliefs from the bad ones. So we have a new problem: How are we to decide which are good methods from the bad ones? If we could fix on a good method for distinguishing between good and bad methods, we might be all set. But this, of course, just moves the problem to a different level. How are we to distinguish between a good method [and a bad method] for choosing good methods? If we continue in this way, of course, we are led to an infinite regress and we will never have the answer to our original question.
The problem Chisholm poses seems to be relatively simple, that is, to understand, not to solve. First, we wonder whether any of our beliefs are true. Then, we realize that we need a method and that is, a criterion of truth for distinguishing true belies from false ones. Finally, we wonder whether our chosen method is a good one. The threat of an infinite regress seems inevitable. Let us see Chisholmís final formulation of the problem.
6.0-Chisholm’s Formulation of the Problem
Chisholm decides to formulate the problem of the criterion with the help of the following two pairs of questions:
A) What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge?
B) How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge? Interestingly, Chisholm notes that the above pairs of questions are relevant with respect to some of the philosophical issues that are involved here . This raises the questions of whether there are also some additional philosophical issues involved, and what are their respective contents. Maybe Chisholm just wants to remark that his initial characterization of the problem is rather broad, and on the basis of it one could drift to consider theories of perception, theories of truth, metaphysical theories of realism and idealism, and whatnot. The questions at hand, however, are not ambiguous, for here we clearly are dealing with the criteria and the extent of knowledge. At first glance, it seems that answering either question presupposes an answer to the other question. It seems that I just cannot start listing instances of knowledge and that is, to give an answer to the questions stated in A and if I have no clue how to distinguish between true and false instances of knowledge. In other words, I need a criterion in order that I could tell what I know. Thus, I should have an answer to the questions stated in B in other to answer the questions stated in A, and vice versa. A skeptical conclusion seems to close in on us. As Chisholm puts it: And so we can formulate the position of the skeptic on these matters. He will say:
You cannot answer question A until you have answered question B. And you cannot answer question B until you have answered question A. Therefore you cannot answer either question. You cannot know what, if anything, you know, and there is no possible way for you to decide in any particular case. Is there any reply to this?
On the basis of the above quotation, Chisholm sees that the problem of the criterion culminates in the following skeptical argument:
Question A: What do we know?
Question B: How are we to decide whether we know?
1. You cannot answer question A until you have answered question B.
2. You cannot answer question B until you have answered question A.
3. Therefore, you cannot answer either question.
According to Chisholm, there are three possible reactions to this argument. The first is the position of the skeptic, who, obviously, accepts the argument and states that there is no possible way for us to decide whether we know anything in any particular case. The other two views refute the skeptical conclusion. The so-called particularists reject the first premise of the skeptical argument, and they claim that we can determine the criterion of knowledge on the basis of our chosen sample of good beliefs. Particularists think that they have an answer to A and on the basis of it they work out their answer to B; From instances of knowledge to criteria of knowledge seems to be their motto. In other words, we are able to pick out true beliefs prior to a usage of any criterion. The last camp, the so-called methodists, proceeds the other way around. Methodists reject the second premise of the skeptical argument and they claim that we can determine the goodness of beliefs on the basis of our pre-chosen criterion. Methodists think that they have an answer to B on the basis of which they figure out their answer to A. From criteria of knowledge to instances of knowledge could be their respective motto. Thus, methodists think that we can pick out the criterion of knowledge prior to any instance of good belief.
In sum, Chisholm understands the problem of the criterion as interrelated questions concerning the criteria and instances of knowledge. According to Chisholm, there are three possible answers or positions with respect to the problem of the criterion. Skeptics claim that we cannot answer either question without presupposing an answer to the other, and therefore the questions cannot be answered at all. Particularists presuppose instances of knowledge and proceed from them to criteria, whereas methodists progress in reverse order.
Furthermore, the problem of Criterion in epistemology raises certain fundamental questions concerning the methods a philosopher ought to use in arriving at both analyses of epistemic concepts and conclusion concerning legitimate principles of reasoning and justification. Therefore, this paper is looking at Roderick Chisholm’s work on epistemology. As Chisholm develops on the problem of Criterion, it is of importance to note that it is based on the thesis “the methodological questions concerning how to identify sources of knowledge or justified belief”. Or more still, sources of knowledge and the problem of criterion, the problem most often associated with the work of Chisholm, concerns not the analysis of epistemic concepts, but the search for “sources” of knowledge and justified belief. Again, one is reminded that the problem of criterion (criteria) is often a function of the desire to occupy favourable ground in the battle with the skeptic or skepticism.
The problem of Criterion does left one first decide what one knows and then try to learn from paradigmatic( prototypical) examples of knowledge the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge? Or does one discover first the necessary and sufficient conditions for apply what one learns to discover what one knows? Or perhaps, should one conclude that it is a mistake to suppose that either sort of discovery takes priority over the other? Following Chisholm’s terminology, we can describe those who give priority to particular knowledge claims, particularists. Those who insist that we be guided by antecedent conclusions about the correct analysis of knowledge, we call generalists or Methodists. For more clarification sake, the below is a concise exposition of Roderick Chisholm’s problem of Criterion.
Again, according to Chisholm, epistemology consists of Socratic inquiry into the questions “What can we know?” and “What are the criteria of knowledge?” He thought that a puzzle faces anyone who attempts to answer these questions. It appears that to answer the first question, one needs a criterion to distinguish between things that are known and things that are not known. That is, one needs an answer to the second question. But to have an answer to the second question, he thought, one needs a list of the things one knows so that one can identify the features that distinguish knowledge from its opposite. That is, one needs an answer to the first question. Lacking such an answer, Chisholm feared, one would not be in a position to be confident that any proposed criterion of knowledge was correct.
7.0-Roderick Chisholm’s Problem of Criterion: Its Epistemological Implication
I- Chishom’s Problem of Criterion raises and Intellectual consciousness:
First of all the problem of criterion helps man to be conscious of what one speaks and talk either while in an individual intellectual voyage or while one engages in a conversation and intellectual dialogue with the others. The problem of criterion would plant this carefulness in man hence makes him to observer rules of the use of language, logic of language since epistemology seeks to arrive truthfulness of what is said to know and again, the certainty of what is said to know.
II- The Epistemic Relevance of the problem of Criterion to the Mass Communicators and the Users of Social media:
One of the epistemic relevance of the Roderick’s problem of Criterion is and should be adopted by the media houses. This is the need to subjecting every information gathered by journalism to epistemic criterion to arriving at truth which more certain and indisputable before the public consumption. If this epistemic method of criterion is adopted on this, the rate of propaganda and fallacies to communication would reduce.
III-Being Responsible of what one has reported, said and the position one is taking:
When one is aware that one will be held responsible of what one is reporting, has said, and the position one is taking, one would subject one’s information gathered and what has claimed to know to critical epistemic analysis that would pass through scrutiny. So that one would not report another thing while one is having another thing in mind. This would reduce the problem of ambiguity and vagueness. One will now examine oneself not just what one claims one knows but the knower itself.
IV-Problem of truth and certainty: It could be roughly said that, in general, criteria specify some conditions that must be fulfilled in order for some A to be B. For example, if one makes a judgment that this apple is sweet there are some specific features that form the basis of one’s judgment. Those features can be said to be the criteria of one’s judgment, and if any other object fulfills the criteria, one’s judgment should be the same. It is another question whether one’s criteria are true or universally valid; if they were, one could formulate the sufficient and necessary conditions, i.e. criteria, for the sweetness of apples. Similarly with respect to the notion of knowledge, one could say that criteria of knowledge specify the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. Now, this paper is not interested in the definition of knowledge, which can be agreed upon as justified true belief. The problem of the criterion is about finding a touchstone for distinguishing true beliefs from false ones. In other words, what this paper is looking for is a criterion of truth. A criterion of truth should be again distinguished from a definition of truth; namely, if one defines truth as correspondence between the propositional content of beliefs and facts, it does not yet give one a criterion with the help of which one can distinguish true from false beliefs.
V- Problem of Skepticism/belief
Supposing that one should distinguish between good and bad apples; one starts picking up the apples and throw the bad apples to one basket, and the good ones to another. Now, if one is asked how one knows which apples are good and which bad, one could refer to some set of characteristics on the basis of which one recognizes the good apples. one could tell that, for example, good apples look, taste, feel, and smell different from bad apples. But now the skeptical twist comes: how could one tell the difference between good and bad beliefs, that is, between true and false beliefs? Of course one can divide one’s belief on the basis of some characteristics of beliefs, but how can one know that one’s chosen characteristics really mark out true beliefs, in contrast to false beliefs?
In other to know, one should be able to distinguish between true and false beliefs. Thus, it seems that one needs a way to distinguish true from false beliefs. Obviously, this way equals to a standard or criterion of true beliefs. The problem arises when one proposes a criterion for true beliefs, for then it can be further asked, how does one knows that one’s chosen criterion holds good? Now, one can try to justify the initial criterion with some supporting reasons, but then, it seems, one should justify these new reasons too. Obviously, this path leads to an infinite regress of reasons.
Alternatively, one can try to avoid the regress by appealing to a preceding reason in our chain of reasons. Unfortunately, supporting one’s claim by appealing to an already stated reason equals to circular reasoning? And circular arguments are not too convincing in general. Finally, one can refuse to justify the alleged criterion and only insist that it holds well, or one can try to justify the criterion with reasons, but at some point refuse to appeal to any new reason and merely insist that the previous reason holds good. However, mere assumption does not seem to be too convincing either. Therefore, it seems that one has only three options in justifying an alleged criterion of true beliefs: either to give infinite reasons, argue circularly, or dogmatically assume that the alleged criterion holds good. Now, the skeptic claims, obviously enough, that none of these three options is acceptable, and that therefore one cannot distinguish between true and false beliefs. Furthermore, the skeptic argues that since one cannot give an acceptable and justified criterion for true beliefs, one cannot know anything. Thus, the problem of the criterion entails skepticism. To clarify, the problem in the problem of the criterion concerns one’s attempts to justify an alleged criterion of true beliefs, and then it is stated that none of the possible ways to justify the criterion is acceptable.
8.0- Conclusion
The problem of Criterion especially as raised by Rederick Chisholm is such that remained intellectual, epistemic and philosophical tools for everyone wishing to have a place in scholarship. It is such that each and everyone are mandated to remain conscious and responsible to what one speaks and know. It is do without tools in scholarship to arriving at any knowledge said to be more or less certain and indisputable. Although various schools of thought have emerged from this but the effort and novelty of knowledge derived from it cannot be down played.
END NOTES
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
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